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Abstract
Since 1990 the number of preferential trade agreements has increased rapidly. Our
argument explains this phenomenon, known as the new regionalism, as a result of
competition for market access. Exporters that face trade diversion because of their 
exclusion from a preferential trade agreement concluded by foreign countries push their 
governments into signing an agreement with the country in which their exports are 
threatened. We test our argument in a quantitative analysis of the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements among 167 countries between 1990 and 2007. The finding
that competition for market access is a major driving force of the new regionalism is a 
contribution to the literature on regionalism and to broader debates about global 
economic regulation.
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1INTRODUCTION1
Since the early 1990s, the world trading system has witnessed a sharp increase in the 
number of preferential trade agreements, leading to a phenomenon that is known as the
‘new regionalism’.2 Although the exact number of preferential trade agreements that 
have been signed over the last half century is disputed, most observers agree that 
currently roughly 300 agreements are in force. The importance of this development for 
participating, as well as for excluded countries has stimulated a substantial scholarly 
literature that explains the spread of agreements with reference to a large number of 
factors. Among them are the stagnation of the process of multilateral trade liberalization, 
the search for economies of scale, the desire to signal commitment to specific trade and 
economic policies, and the protection of foreign direct investments. Some agreements 
are also seen to have been driven by the geopolitical interests of the participating 
countries.
We offer an explanation for the new regionalism that sees preferential trade 
agreements mainly as response to the preferential trade policies of other countries. In 
this view, countries excluded from an agreement try to avoid the negative consequences 
of trade diversion by signing new agreements.3 The specific argument that we propose, 
which we label the protection-for-exporters argument, builds on the assumption that 
exporters lobby more against certain losses of foreign market access than in favour of 
potential opportunities. Given this differential propensity to lobby, discrimination 
abroad is expected to lead to a shift in the balance between exporters and import-
competitors in a country. A shift in the balance between these two interests, in turn, 
brings about changes in the trade policies pursued, that is, governments are now 
2expected to implement trade policies to protect exporter interests. One way of doing so 
is to sign preferential trade agreements with countries that are already party to such 
agreements.
We test the protection-for-exporters argument against alternative explanations in 
a quantitative analysis of the proliferation of preferential trade agreements among 167 
countries between 1990 and 2007. In carrying out this analysis, we introduce several 
improvements with respect to data and method to the quantitative literature on 
preferential trade agreements. For one, we have designed a test of the protection-for-
exporters argument that captures the causal logic of countries responding to trade 
diversion as directly as possible. Second, we have established a new list of trade 
agreements, which represents an improvement on the datasets used in previous studies in 
terms of completeness and inclusion of recent agreements (up to and including 2007). 
Finally, we have exercised particular caution in controlling for alternative explanations 
to avoid overestimating the explanatory power of our own argument. The findings 
provide strong support for our argument. The choice by different countries to enter into 
preferential trade agreements is indeed interdependent. Such interdependence increases 
with the negative externalities from existing agreements.
Beyond speaking to the literature on regionalism in the world economy, we also 
strive to make a contribution to a growing number of studies on policy diffusion and 
policy interdependence.4 Increasingly, scholars of international relations are realizing 
that dyads do not act in isolation, and are trying to model the interdependence among 
them.5 For example, policy interdependence has been shown to be a driving force behind 
the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties.6 We add to this literature by taking 
3seriously a recent call to accept that ‘space is more than geography’ when 
operationalizing the impact that a dyad’s decision to pursue a trade agreement has on 
other dyads.7 In particular, we pay attention to extra-dyadic relationships when 
calculating the degree of dependence between two observations.
Our paper also is of relevance for broader debates about the governance of 
international economic relations. In fact, preferential trade agreements are far more than 
agreements that regulate trade in goods. Many of the more recent agreements encompass 
hundreds of pages of detailed rules on a variety of topics, such as intellectual property 
rights, investments and standard setting. That such far-reaching agreements are often 
signed in reaction to agreements concluded by other countries is a significant finding. It 
shows that governments tie their hands on a large number of topics because their 
country’s dependence on foreign markets compels them do so. Our assessment of the 
new regionalism is, hence, far less benign than that reached by scholars in the neoliberal 
institutionalist tradition, who see the spread of trade agreements as an expression of 
functional international cooperation.
THE PROTECTION-FOR-EXPORTERS ARGUMENT
Over the last twenty years, the number of dyads forming part of a preferential trade 
agreement has increased sharply (see Figure 1). While in 1990 only 245 pairs of 
countries had a preferential trade agreement between them, the number stood at 2,123 in 
2007.8 With up to 13,861 dyads in our dataset, this means that 15.3 per cent of all dyads 
have a preferential trade link.9 In terms of number of actual agreements, we consider 247 
trade agreements signed between 1990 and 2007. This number is composed of 159 
bilateral, eighty-six plurilateral, and two inter-regional (the Andean Community-
4Mercosur agreement signed in 2004 and the European Free Trade Association-Southern 
African Customs Union agreement signed in 2006) agreements. Among the plurilateral 
agreements, we coded sixty-three agreements between a regional trading entity and an 
individual country. These are agreements signed by trading entities, such as the 
Caribbean Community, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the EU, and 
Mercosur, with third countries. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Owing to its large number of member countries and agreements concluded with 
third countries (we have twenty-three such agreements in the database for the period 
1990-2007, some of which have been superseded by accession agreements), the 
European Union (EU) accounts for a sizeable number of the dyads with trade 
agreements. While the EU’s increasing membership and continued attractiveness as a 
partner for preferential trade agreements is itself support for our argument, the process 
that we aim to explain is not limited to the EU. Our data show that across the world, the 
number of agreements being signed has increased over the last two decades. In 
particular, a growing number of South-South agreements and agreements involving 
Asian countries have come into existence over the last few years.
What explains this proliferation of preferential trade agreements across the 
world? The protection-for-exporters argument that we set out to respond to this question 
builds on a series of studies on the external effects of preferential trade agreements.10
Common to these studies is the assumption that preferential trade policies hurt outsiders 
5by way of trade diversion.11 When witnessing the costs, outsiders react, either by joining 
a preferential trade agreement or by setting up an alternative one. Over time, this leads to 
the spread of preferential trade agreements. While, so far, most studies that developed 
this argument have treated states as unitary actors, our explanation provides domestic 
underpinnings for this logic. As will become evident, basing the argument in domestic 
politics changes expectations about policy outcomes. Following a statist approach, an 
excluded country reacts to a preferential trade agreement between foreign countries 
whenever the costs from trade diversion exceed the gains that it may reap from the 
agreement, for example, because of accelerated economic growth in the preferential 
trading area. By contrast, following our political economy argument, an excluded 
country reacts even if it gains in the aggregate, as long as the costs are large enough for a 
group of exporters to engage in political activity.
The protection-for-exporters argument starts with the assumption that trade 
policy-making is shaped by competition between two constituencies, namely, exporters 
and import-competitors. Exporters benefit from better foreign market access and import-
competitors from continued protection of their sector against foreign competition. While 
potentially both trade policy constituencies can engage in lobbying, asking politicians to 
consider their interests when implementing trade policies, we assume that exporters 
often fail to become politically active. Exporters are likely to face uncertainty with 
respect to the potential benefits from engaging in lobbying for better foreign market 
access because they tend to have too little information about and to underestimate the 
potential opportunities they may be missing in a foreign market.12 Moreover, even if 
they are aware of a missed opportunity, they face uncertainty about the willingness of a 
6foreign government to reduce its trade barriers in exchange for concessions.13 This 
uncertainty is even further enhanced by the fact that trade negotiations tend to take place 
over a substantial period of time, making it difficult to know the competitive situation of 
an exporter at the time the agreement enters into effect. As a result, it is difficult for an 
exporter to predict whether she, or rather another exporter from the same country, will 
reap the potential benefits of better foreign market access. In the case of plurilateral 
agreements, the benefits of trade liberalization may even go to an exporter from another 
country.14 In short, it can be expected that uncertainty inhibits exporters from lobbying 
for gains. Only few exporters will manage to become politically active, ensuring that the 
balance of domestic interests is biased in favour of import-competing interests.15
Exporters’ incentives to mobilize are substantially different when facing losses, 
caused, for example, by the creation of a preferential trading arrangement among foreign 
countries that leads to trade diversion.16 In this situation, rather than having to invest in 
monitoring foreign markets to gather information about export opportunities, they can 
simply react in a fire-brigade manner to any losses they experience from the trade policy 
choices of foreign countries. Moreover, they can be quite certain about the consequences 
of their lobbying activity. If they manage to achieve the re-establishment of the market 
conditions that existed before the creation of the preferential trade agreement, they 
should be able to regain their share of that market. Exporters’ uncertainty in lobbying 
against losses, consequently, should be lower than the uncertainty in lobbying for gains. 
The expectation derived from this reasoning, then, is that a stronger lobby effort by 
exporters should be visible in response to losses than in pursuit of potential gains.17
7Existing research confirms the plausibility of this expectation. Already in 1966, 
Raymond Vernon affirmed that ‘threat in general is a more reliable stimulus [for 
enterprises] to action than opportunity is likely to be.’18 More recently, I. M. Destler 
stressed that ‘It is the embattled losers in trade who go into politics.’19 In fact, ample 
evidence exists for changes in the balance of domestic interests in response to 
discrimination abroad. For example, in Japan, import-competing interests, which oppose 
preferential trade agreements, dominated trade politics throughout the 1990s. Their 
influence was only broken when Japanese exporters mobilized in response to losses 
abroad.20 In particular, exporters became active in lobbying against discrimination in 
Mexico and Chile, two countries that had signed agreements with both the United States 
(U.S.) and the EU.21 Another example is the mobilization of South Korean firms in 
response to the signing of the China-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Agreement in 2010. 
The discrimination that this agreement is expected to cause has created significant 
business demand for a South Korea-China trade agreement that is likely to overcome 
opposition among South Korean farmers.22
What effect does such a shift in the balance of domestic interests have on trade 
policy choices? We assume that a government, independent of whether or not it is 
democratically legitimized, will take into account the balance of domestic interests when 
formulating its trade policy, even if domestic interests do not perfectly translate into 
government policies.23 The balance of domestic interests is an important consideration 
for decision-makers because organized interests that are dissatisfied with government 
policy may reduce their support for government and/or increase their backing for the 
opposition, thus threatening decision-makers’ hold on office. Among the many tactics 
8open to interest groups to influence election campaigns are reducing or increasing 
campaign contributions and providing or withholding policy-relevant information. They 
can also make use of outside lobbying that aims at alerting public opinion to a specific 
issue, which in turn may shape a candidate’s chances of re-election. In 2010, for 
example, U.S. business lobbies, such as the Business Roundtable and the National 
Association of Manufacturers, engaged in public campaigns that stressed the loss of jobs 
resulting from the U.S. failure to ratify trade agreements with South Korea and 
Colombia.
The expectation, then, is for governments to pursue policies that satisfy import-
competing interests in the absence of foreign discrimination. By contrast, in the presence 
of foreign discrimination, the government is no longer only attentive to the interests of 
import competitors, but is also concerned about the protection of exporters’ interests. In 
this situation, the country should enter into negotiations for a trade agreement with the 
country in which exporters face losses of market access. In response to the exporter 
lobbying discussed above, Japan, for example, concluded preferential trade agreements 
with Mexico (2004) and Chile (2007).
The strength of the protection-for-exporters effect depends on the amount of 
trade diversion that an agreement between two countries causes for an excluded country. 
The larger the trade diversion, the more politically active we expect exporters to be, and 
the more eager the government of an excluded country should be to sign an agreement 
with the member country in which it faces discrimination. To clarify, the likelihood of 
an agreement between two countries is not simply a function of the number of 
agreements that these countries have signed with third countries but of the agreements’ 
9cumulative discriminatory effect. In other words, preferential trade agreements should 
not have an effect on the trade policy choices of excluded countries unless they generate 
trade diversion. If we were to see that preferential agreements spread to countries that do 
not suffer from trade diversion, this would be an indication that an alternative diffusion 
mechanism is at play, a question that we take up below.
While so far we have only explained changes in individual countries’ preferences 
with respect to signing a preferential trade agreement, the successful conclusion of trade 
negotiations requires agreement between at least two countries. Why would a member 
country of a preferential agreement accept the conclusion of a trade agreement with an 
excluded country? Our argument is that the member country will accept an agreement 
only if its exporters face discrimination in the excluded country and hence are also 
politically active (the inverted logic). Following this logic, for example, the EU-Mexico 
agreement (2000) came about because the EU faced discrimination in Mexico, as did 
Mexico in the EU.24 The argument thus can be formulated in the form of the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The more discrimination that countries A and B face in each other’s 
markets, the higher the probability of a preferential trade agreement between 
them.
Any explanation relying on such a snowball or domino effect begs the question 
of why the initial event comes about, in this case, why the initial agreement was signed. 
In line with the protection-for-exporters argument, we suggest that, in some cases, 
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governments may be able to design an agreement that imposes costs on third countries 
rather than domestic import-competing interests.25 In such a case, in the absence of 
opposition from import-competitors, governments may find it beneficial to conclude an 
agreement. An initial agreement may also come about between adjacent countries, since 
here exporters’ uncertainty about the potential benefits of trade liberalization is likely to 
be at its most minimal. For some of the initial agreements, an explanation may also 
require consideration of factors exogenous to the argument, such as the geopolitical 
interests of countries.
Countries could also be expected to conclude preferential trade agreements in a 
pro-active manner because they expect to benefit from the external effect that we 
describe here. In fact, there are some historical examples of countries using preferential 
trade agreements to put pressure on third countries. Some evidence suggests that the 
U.S. used the threat of preferential liberalization as part of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) to force the EU into accepting the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round.26 The empirical record, however, suggests that in most cases decision-makers do 
not anticipate the external consequences of a preferential trade agreement. In some 
cases, they were even surprised by these effects. Few observers, for example, predicted 
that the deepening of European integration in the 1980s would cause concern among 
third countries.27
Although we have formulated our argument using the example of bilateral
agreements, the logic also applies to plurilateral preferential agreements. For exporters 
in third countries, the effects of plurilateral and bilateral agreements are similar, with the 
only major difference being that a plurilateral agreement threatens access to several 
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markets at the same time. The precise reaction of an excluded country to such a 
plurilateral agreement will depend on its export interests. If it only faces discrimination 
in one country, it will seek to conclude a bilateral agreement with that country.28 If it 
faces discrimination in more than one market, however, it may decide to apply for 
accession to an existing agreement.
In solely concentrating on the probability of a negotiated agreement between an 
excluded and a member country, we ignore three alternative courses of action that an 
aggrieved country could pursue. For one, it may threaten retaliation against countries 
that engage in preferential trade policies. When the European Union moved towards a 
deepening of integration in the late 1980s, the U.S. responded with threats to all 
proposals that had the potential of imposing costs on its exporters. The Deputy Secretary 
of State, John C. Whitehead referred to the U.S.’s ‘potent retaliation ability’, to counter 
discrimination in the EC.29 However, only structurally powerful countries can make use 
of such threats. Weaker countries responded to the Single Market Programme with 
requests for bilateral agreements, a response that we capture with the argument 
presented here.
A second possible reaction to discrimination is a call for multilateral trade 
liberalization. Again, the U.S. response to European integration best illustrates this 
tactic. The creation of the European Economic Community in the late 1950s caused
concern among American exporters. Instead of signing a preferential agreement with the 
new trading entity, the U.S. used the Kennedy Round of world trade negotiations (1964-
67) to reduce discrimination resulting from the European move. Finally, a government 
may decide to compensate exporters that face costs from trade diversion by way of a 
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subsidy. World trade rules, however, impose strict limits on the use of subsidies; 
moreover, governments violating these rules have to fear the imposition of 
countervailing duties, which are explicitly allowed by World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules.30 Disregarding these alternative tactics, which may all be driven by the aim of 
protecting exporter interests in the face of foreign discrimination, may lead us to 
underestimate the external effect of preferential trade agreements.
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION
Several qualitative case studies have shown the plausibility of the argument that 
countries respond to discrimination from preferential trade agreements. By contrast, only
a few studies have tried to quantitatively test the idea.31 While these studies provide 
interesting insights, they are characterized by a series of shortcomings. Early 
quantitative studies, for example, did not explicitly model the spatial interdependence at 
the heart of the theoretical argument. More recent studies that do so either restrict the 
analysis to a small sample of countries or use a very rough proxy for the potential trade 
diversion caused by an earlier agreement.32 Our aim is both to build on and to go beyond 
this literature by designing a test that captures the trade diversion logic that underlies our 
argument as closely as possible, establishing an up-to-date list of trade agreements, and 
controlling for alternative diffusion mechanisms.
Our database of preferential trade agreements covers 167 countries and all years 
from 1990 until 2007. We limited the analysis to agreements concluded from 1990 
onwards for three reasons: first, as is evident from Figure 1 above, relatively few 
agreements were signed between 1945 and 1990. By including these years, we would 
capture little additional variation in our dependent variable. Second, if the dataset were 
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to be extended to the years prior to 1990, we would most likely overestimate the degree 
of spatial interdependence. As explained below, in our measure of spatial 
interdependence we include the dependent variable, lagged by one year. As the other 
two variables that are included in this measure (namely, trade and trade competition) 
vary little over time, we would potentially face a serious problem of auto-correlation if 
we considered a longer time period. Third, our decision to limit the time period was also 
driven by the practical problems of calculating spatial weights in a dataset that would be 
increased to more than 500,000 observations if we considered all years since the 1950s 
and of finding reliable data (in particular, dyadic and sectoral trade data) for all countries 
in earlier years.
With respect to country coverage, we have tried to include as many countries as 
possible in our analysis. Nevertheless, we have had to exclude some (mostly small) 
countries owing to data restrictions, for example, in the Caribbean region (Antigua and 
Barbuda, Saint Kitts and Nevis) but also in the Republic of China (Taiwan). This leads 
to the elimination of a few dyads with preferential trade agreements. We also exclude 
Montenegro, as it only came into existence in 2006 and, hence, would have been in the 
database for only two years. A few other countries that became independent after 1990 
enter the database in the year of their independence. In total, we consider up to 13,861 
dyads per year for a total number of 237,644 observations. The dyads included in the 
analysis are non-directional, that is, we do not distinguish between the country pair 
Albania-Argentina and the reverse country pair Argentina-Albania. Doing so makes 
sense since we expect that an agreement only comes about if there is an incentive for 
both sides to engage in and conclude trade negotiations. Even if there is significant 
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pressure on one side, a preferential trade agreement may not be signed if the other side 
feels little or no pressure to do so.
For each dyad, we coded whether or not it signed a trade agreement in a specific 
year. Opting for the year of signature rather than the year of entry into force of an 
agreement makes sense, since signing an agreement is an important indication that 
governments respond to exporter lobbying. The year of signature is also important for 
the effect that agreements have, since it is in this moment that we expect exporters in 
third countries to start worrying about the expected negative consequences for them. We 
invested substantial effort in establishing a comprehensive and up-to-date list of trade 
agreements signed between 1990 and 2007. Largely (but not solely) relying on three 
different databases, namely the list of regional trade agreements notified with the WTO, 
the Tuck Trade Agreements Database, and the McGill Faculty of Law Preferential Trade 
Agreements Database and excluding agreements that do not include concrete steps 
towards the establishment of a preferential trading area, we find that 1,878 dyads formed 
a preferential trade agreement between 1990 and 2007.33 This data on membership in 
preferential agreements is significantly more comprehensive than that used in similar 
studies.34
We do not consider new agreements signed between two countries that already 
have a preferential link.35 This is a significant restriction especially for European dyads, 
many of which have participated in a stepwise deepening of integration. In addition, 
many bilateral agreements between the European Union and third countries across 
Europe were later converted into accession treaties. All Central and Eastern European 
countries, for example, signed bilateral free trade agreements with the EU in the 1990s. 
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Our decision to limit ourselves to the analysis of the first agreement between two 
countries leads us to disregard the accession of twelve of these countries to the EU 
between 2004 and 2007. While such a deepening of integration can have effects similar 
to those captured by our theoretical argument (and can be a reaction to preferential trade 
agreements among third countries), we decided to exclude these cases from our analysis 
to secure unit homogeneity, as the political economy of deepening an agreement may be 
different from the political economy of an initial agreement.
The decision to limit ourselves to the analysis of the first agreement between two 
countries also requires us to drop country pairs from the analysis that already formed 
part of an effective preferential trade agreement in 1990. The agreements that we 
consider to have been effectively implemented as of 1 January 1990 are: the EU (with 
twelve member countries); the EFTA; the agreements between the EU and EFTA 
countries; the agreements between the EU and Cyprus, Israel, and Malta; the agreements 
between the U.S. and Canada and Israel; the agreements between Australia and New 
Zealand and Papua New Guinea; the Caribbean Community; and the South African 
Customs Union. The 245 dyads that participated in these agreements are excluded from 
the analysis. We did not drop dyads that formed part of agreements such as the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA, 1980) and the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS, 1983) even though they were formally in existence in 
1990. The reason for doing so is that these agreements have never been effectively 
implemented. The LAIA, for example, did not lead to any significant preferential tariff 
reductions (although it did give rise to a series of partial scope agreements that we 
include in our analysis) and ECCAS was suspended right after having been signed 
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because of military conflict in the area.36 Such agreements, which only exist on paper, 
should neither contribute to the domino effect we are interested in nor keep participating 
countries from signing new agreements among them.
Operationalizing Trade Diversion and Policy Diffusion
We capture the external competitive effect of preferential trade agreements by way of a 
spatial weight matrix. A spatial weight matrix measures the impact of a policy change in 
a dyad on all other dyads. It uses specific factors, such as spatial proximity or degree of 
economic interdependence, to weigh the importance of a policy change in one unit for 
other units.37 In our case, the policy change is whether a dyad signed an agreement 
between one and five years ago. The variable is lagged by one year to avoid a 
simultaneity bias. This may lead to an underestimation of the spatial effect, if countries 
already react to other countries’ announcement of negotiations of preferential trade 
agreements. The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-
CAFTA) illustrates this effect. The Dominican Republic initially was excluded from the 
agreement signed between the U.S. and five Central American countries in May 2004. 
Fear of discrimination is a plausible reason for the Dominican Republic’s decision to 
also engage in negotiations with the U.S., leading to the signing of DR-CAFTA in 
August of the same year. With our operationalization, we fail to capture the policy 
interdependence that shaped the outcome. The reason for the five-year cut-off point is 
that the external effect of a preferential trade agreement should disappear after some 
time, because exporters either are successful in convincing their government to reach an 
agreement with the members of a preferential trade agreement or adapt to the new 
situation.38
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We weigh the influence of the policy change on other dyads in a way that 
approximates as closely as possible the theoretical logic underlying the protection-for-
exporters argument. Our hypothesis leads us to the expectation that the pressure on 
excluded country B to respond to the preferential trade agreements signed by country A 
depends on the potential for trade diversion it faces in that country. What we want to 
capture is the potential for trade diversion, as the actors do not have access to post hoc
estimates of trade diversion. The potential for trade diversion, in turn, is mainly 
determined by the amount of exports from B to A and the degree of competition between 
the exports of B and those of the countries that have a preferential agreement with 
country A.39 On the one hand, the impact of a preferential agreement will be particularly 
severe for countries with major export interests in one of the member countries. The 
greater the share of exports concerned, the greater the potential costs, and the greater 
also the political power of the exporters concerned. We use the share of B’s total exports 
going to A to capture this effect. A potential problem with this operationalization is that 
export shares are partly endogenous to our argument. The share of B’s exports going to 
A will decrease in the aftermath of the latter signing a preferential trade agreement with 
country C if B’s exports compete with those of C. We deal with this potential 
endogeneity problem by lagging the trade data by one year.
On the other hand, the extent to which the exports of the excluded country B 
directly compete with those from C in the market of A is an important determinant of 
trade diversion. For example, the EU should have reacted to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement by signing an agreement with Mexico, as it exports similar goods to 
that country as does the U.S.40 In fact, this is what happened in March 2000. That it did 
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not sign an agreement with the U.S. also supports our logic, as the EU’s exports to the 
U.S. do not compete with those from Mexico. To capture this effect, we disaggregated 
trade flows to the sector level and then assessed whether countries export the same 
basket of goods.41
In form of a formula, the spatial weight for the undirected dyad AB is:42
  
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where 
AB
k and 
BA
k are the competitive distances for the two directed dyads. PTA is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country A (B) signed an agreement with 
countries C, D, and so on between one and five years ago. The competitive distances are 
zero if there is no connection between countries A and B. Equation (3) shows that we 
take the smaller of the two pressures for the directed dyads AB and BA to arrive at the 
score for the undirected dyad. Doing so captures the idea that an agreement will only 
come about if exporters from both countries are discriminated against in the other’s 
market. The mean value across all dyads of this variable varies over time, from 0 in 
1990, to 0.021 in 1997, and to 0.0014 in 2007.43
Figure 2 provides a schematic representation of how this variable may change for 
a dyad by looking at the country pair Chile-U.S. (the figure is an abstraction and does 
not show all the agreements signed by the two countries in this period). Initially, the 
signature of the U.S.-Canada agreement (1988) and, in particular, of NAFTA (1992) 
should have increased the pressure on Chile to sign an agreement with the U.S. In fact, 
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shortly after the conclusion of NAFTA, there was talk of Chile becoming a member of 
that agreement.44 At that time, however, the U.S. felt hardly any pressure to sign an 
agreement with Chile. The agreements between a series of Latin American countries 
(among them, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela in 1993) and Chile only had a minor 
impact on the U.S., because these countries exported little to Chile and because their 
exports did not compete with those from the U.S. in the Chilean market. Our counter-
factual expectation is that if Chile had signed a trade agreement with a direct competitor 
of the U.S., a Chile-U.S. trade agreement would have already come about in the 1990s.45
In the absence of such an agreement, the U.S. only became willing to sign an agreement 
with Chile in 2003, one year after that country signed a trade agreement with the EU, a 
major competitor of the U.S.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Alternative Diffusion Mechanisms
Besides reaction to trade diversion, several alternative causal mechanisms could drive 
the diffusion of trade agreements. In the empirical analysis below, we control for the 
possibility that diffusion is a result of either emulation or security externalities. 
Emulation, which is defined as ritualistically ‘following or doing oppositely of others’46, 
results from a demonstration effect.47 Such an effect is most likely among countries that 
are close either geographically or culturally, because there is more communication 
between geographically close countries and because it is easier to relate to the 
experiences of culturally close actors. The expectation, thus, is that the probability of a 
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preferential trade agreement between countries A and B grows with the number of 
preferential agreements in which A and B participate and the diminishing distance, 
either geographic or cultural, between the two countries. We capture the geographic 
distance argument by multiplying the reciprocal of distance with the number of 
agreements that the other country signed within the past five years.48 Building on work 
by Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, we construct three different 
spatial weight matrices to capture cultural distance.49 Each of the matrices uses a 
different proxy for cultural distance: whether two countries share the same predominant 
language, predominant religion, and a common colonial past.
Diffusion of trade agreements could also result from security externalities. 
Neorealist International Relations theory argues that the anarchic structure of the 
international system makes states apprehensive of increases in the power of other states, 
as these states may use their new capabilities to attack and defeat them.50 Whenever 
preferential trade agreements stimulate trade flows between two countries, they lead to a 
more efficient allocation of resources and thus free up some resources for military use.51
The increasing wealth and power of member countries should be of concern to excluded 
countries that are military rivals. An agreement between two countries may thus force 
other dyads to follow suit, with the aim of retaining their current relative position vis-à-
vis these countries. According to this view, what we should witness is the development 
of rival trade blocs that mirror security alliances. To capture this effect, we calculate a 
spatial weight matrix that increases the probability of two countries signing an 
agreement if they had a military conflict with a third country in the period since World 
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War II. The more trade agreements this third country signed in the past five years, the 
higher the pressure on its military rivals to sign a trade agreement.
Control Variables
We also control for a series of characteristics of the dyad under analysis that could 
influence the probability of two countries signing an agreement and the context in which 
a dyad considers concluding an agreement. Doing so is vital to avoid overestimating the 
effect of the spatial lags, as parallel policy choices may be a result not only of spatial 
interdependence, but also of correlated unit-level factors or the exogenous shocks that 
are common to various dyads.52 In line with previous studies in the field, we hence 
include several economic, geographical, and political control variables in our model. 
Most of these variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems.53
With regard to the variables capturing the economic conditions in place at the 
time a pair of countries is considering signing an agreement, we first control for the 
amount of trade between them (TRADE). An increase in trade may boost the probability 
of two countries forming a preferential trade agreement since large trade flows are likely 
to be accompanied by relation-specific investments, which would result in traders 
becoming more dependent on access to each other’s markets. These traders then may ask 
for a preferential trade agreement to lock in the existing situation and to forestall either 
side from adopting protectionist trade policies.54 Trade may also be a factor because the 
positive welfare effects of a preferential trade agreement should be more significant for 
country pairs having large trade flows before the conclusion of the agreement.55
We also take into account the size of the economy of the two countries in order 
to capture the idea that the economic gains will be greater the larger are the countries 
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participating in a preferential trade agreement. As Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand 
argue, a preferential agreement between two large economies increases the volume of 
trade between two small economies in more ways than one.56 In addition, a more 
sizeable increase in trade among two large countries causes a larger net expansion of 
demand and, as such, a larger rise in real income. We capture this idea by including the 
GDP of the smaller of the two countries in a dyad (GDP). A further economic factor that 
may influence the likelihood of an agreement between a pair of countries is their level of 
development. The more developed the two countries, the easier they should find it to 
conclude an agreement. There are two reasons for this expectation. First, a country with 
a highly developed economy is less dependent on tariff revenues. Second, a developed 
country is in a better position to compensate societal groups that face adjustment costs 
arising from trade liberalization.57 The variable that captures this argument is the GDP 
per capita of the less developed of the two countries (GDP PER CAPITA).
Two control variables capture domestic and international political conditions. At 
the international level, military allies would be expected to be more likely to sign an 
agreement than other pairs of countries (ALLIANCE). At the domestic level, previous 
research has shown that democratic pairs of countries tend to sign more preferential 
trade agreements than non-democratic or mixed pairs.58 We use the seven point Freedom 
House scale of democracy to measure this variable.59 The Freedom House index has the 
advantage of covering all the countries for the full duration of our dataset.60 We invert 
the values provided by Freedom House so that 1 is the value for a completely oppressive 
regime and 7 the value for a completely free regime (DEMOCRACY).
23
Further, we include three variables that capture the geographic position of the 
two countries. For one, since trade costs increase with distance, geographically 
proximate countries are more likely to form a preferential trade agreement than 
geographically distant countries.61 We thus incorporate the (natural logarithm of the) 
distance in kilometres between the two capitals of the pair of countries in our model 
(DISTANCE). In addition, neighbouring countries can be expected to be more likely to 
sign an agreement. On average, adjacent countries have closer economic and stronger 
political ties. Following this reasoning, we expect countries that share a common border 
to be more likely to sign an agreement (CONTIGUITY). Finally, we control for whether at 
least one of the two countries is an island, as the specific geographical circumstances of 
such countries may influence their likelihood of signing an agreement (ISLAND).
Four control variables account for the position of the countries in, and the 
general state of, the international trading system. Since members of the WTO tend to 
have more similar trade policies than countries that do not form part of this international 
organization, dyads in which both countries are WTO members should be more likely to 
conclude an agreement (WTO). In addition, we consider the possibility that countries’ 
propensity to conclude preferential trade agreements increases during WTO-sponsored 
multilateral trade negotiations (WTO ROUND). We also control for the argument that 
involvement in trade disputes may influence a pair’s likelihood to conclude a trade 
agreement. Having a trade dispute with the other side should decrease the probability of 
an agreement (TRADE DISPUTE), while having a dispute with a third party should increase 
it (TRADE DISPUTE THIRD PARTY).62
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Further, we use three proxies to capture the cultural distance between the two 
countries, as culturally similar countries may find it easier to negotiate an international 
agreement. These proxies are common principal language, same religion, and common 
colonial heritage (LANGUAGE, RELIGION, and COLONY). Finally, we include the (natural 
log of the) sum of the number of agreements signed by the two countries prior to time t 
to control for potential endogeneity resulting from the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable as an independent variable in our model.63
FINDINGS
We use survival analysis, and more specifically, a Cox proportional hazards model with 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on dyads, to examine our argument.64 The 
advantage of using the Cox model over the various survival models on offer is that it 
does not require us to make assumptions about the shape of the underlying survival
distribution.65 As described above, our model includes a spatial lag to capture the 
external competitive effect of the decision by two countries to sign an agreement, 
several alternative spatial lags, and control variables for both the dyad under 
consideration and potential external shocks.66 We thus estimate the following equation:
hij,t = h0(ij,t)exp[β1 w ij,t-1 y ij,t. + β2 xij,t-1 + εij,t] (4)
where hijt is the hazard rate for two countries i and j at time t, h0 is the baseline hazard, 
β1 and β2 are vectors of coefficients, xij,t-1 is a vector of control variables that are lagged 
by a year, wij,t-1 yij,t
. is a vector of spatial lag terms that are temporally lagged as 
described above, and εij,t is the error term. As is common practice in recent research on 
the statistical analysis of panel data with a binary dependent variable, we base 
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significance tests on Huber (robust) standard errors.67 These standard errors can take 
account of possible heteroskedasticity and potentially unequal variances across dyads.
The findings are very supportive of our argument (see Model 1 in Table 1). The 
coefficient for the trade and competition variable has the right sign and is highly 
statistically significant. Of the alternative spatial weight terms, only two, namely the 
ones capturing geographic distance and common language, are statistically significant. 
Interestingly, if two countries are geographically close and have signed trade agreements 
in the past five years, they are less likely to sign an agreement with each other than 
countries that are geographically more distant. The finding that a country is influenced 
by the agreements concluded by other countries that share a common language is more 
intuitive. The lack of support for the geopolitical rivalry argument also is remarkable. In 
the post-Cold War world, it seems, countries do not react to agreements concluded by 
countries that may pose a military threat.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Turning to the remaining variables, many of those that have been emphasized in 
previous research also turn out to be significant in this model, giving added plausibility 
to our findings. Looking first at the variables capturing economic conditions, as 
expected, a pair of countries with a strong trade link is more likely to form a trade 
agreement. The economic size of two countries also has an impact on the likelihood of 
them signing an agreement. By contrast, the level of economic development of the two 
countries considering the conclusion of a trade agreement does not play a role. Security 
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concerns equally have an effect on the probability of signing a preferential trade 
agreement, as countries that form part of the same alliance are more likely to sign a trade 
agreement. Democracy, moreover, is statistically significant, which is in line with 
previous research. As the original study on the role of democracy in the conclusion of 
trade agreements only had data up until 1992, whereas our database covers agreements 
until 2007, our findings provide important support for this earlier study.68 The finding 
that distance reduces the likelihood of an agreement between two countries is intuitive. 
The same applies to the result that country pairs of which at least one is an island are 
less likely to conclude an agreement. By contrast, the strongly statistically significant 
negative sign of the estimated coefficient for contiguity is somewhat surprising. A 
potential explanation for this result is that contiguity does not add anything to the 
likelihood of two countries signing an agreement that is not already captured by 
distance, trade flows, and often similar culture of neighbouring countries.69
With respect to the variables capturing the influence of the international trading 
system on the decision of two countries to conclude an agreement, dyads in which both 
countries are members of the WTO are more likely to sign trade agreements. Moreover, 
countries are more likely to sign an agreement in tandem with negotiations at the WTO 
level. The effect of a trade dispute between pair of countries on their proneness to sign 
an agreement has the right sign and is statistically significant. Surprising, given the 
findings reported in a study by Mansfield and Reinhardt, is the result that two countries 
are less likely to sign an agreement if they have a trade dispute with third countries.70
Moreover, all three variables capturing the cultural distance between two countries are 
statistically significant, although the finding that common language reduces a dyad’s 
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probability of signing an agreement is unexpected. Finally, the temporal lag variable that 
controls for potential endogeneity is not statistically significant.
Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of the effect that we estimate.71 It shows the 
effect of an increase in the value of the trade and competition variable from the smallest 
to the largest value. At the minimum, a dyad’s survival rate declines from 1 to 0.92 over 
the 18 year period. At the maximum, by contrast, the drop is from 1 to 0.15. This 
sizeable difference is an indication of the strength of the effect that we find. A 
comparison of the predicted probabilities of a dyad signing an agreement for low and 
high values on the trade and competition variable provides a further illustration of the 
magnitude of the effect of this variable. Taking the mean predicted survival probability 
for all dyads with a value larger than the mean on the trade and competition variable, the 
overall prediction is for 111 dyads (with the 95 per cent confidence interval going from 
100 to 122) forming a preferential trade agreement each year. By contrast, when using 
the mean predicted survival probability for those dyads with a value lower than the mean 
on the trade and competition variable, only 54 dyads (the 95 confidence intervals goes 
from 46 to 62) are expected to sign an agreement each year. The expected number of 
preferential agreements thus doubles for dyads that face significant trade diversion as a 
result of preferential trade agreements between other countries.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Robustness Checks
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We undertook a series of tests to examine the robustness of these results to changes in 
operationalization. First, we estimated models in which we assume that preferential trade 
agreements have an impact on third countries for, respectively, between one and three 
(Model 2 in Table 1) and between one and seven years (Model 3) after their signature. 
These changes control for the robustness of our initial hunch of a five-year effect. 
Whereas in the three-year model the coefficient just misses the 95 per cent confidence 
level (p=0.53), in the seven-year model the variable is statistically significant. These 
findings indicate that our five-year cut-off point is reasonable and that countries need 
some time to negotiate preferential trade agreements in response to discrimination. A 
further important result of these models is that the estimated coefficients for all other 
variables are not affected by these changes in our independent variable of interest. 
Second, we checked whether our results are robust to a different 
operationalization of potential for trade diversion. Specifically, we calculated a spatial 
weight term that only includes the competition and PTA terms from formulas 1 and 2, 
thus excluding trade shares. The reason for doing so is that exporters may not be 
concerned about the size of the trade flows affected by a preferential trade agreement 
from which they are excluded, but only about the fact that they compete with the third 
country in that market.72 Doing so does not change the substantive findings (Model 4 in 
Table 1). In fact, the model is highly robust to this change. Third, we made sure that our 
results are not influenced by the decision to log the spatial variables (Model 5 in Table 
1). Again, the main results reported previously are not affected by this robustness check. 
Finally, we omitted the three variables capturing cultural distance between two countries 
(language, religion, and colony) to check whether this influences the findings for the 
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alternative diffusion mechanisms.73 Even in this model, however, the spatial lags 
capturing diffusion via a common colonial heritage and geopolitical rivalry do not have 
a statistically significant effect on the signing of new preferential trade agreements.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that exporters increase their level of political activity in response to 
trade diversion resulting from the creation of preferential trade agreements from which 
they are excluded. The mobilization of exporters, in turn, brings about a change in the 
balance of domestic interests that encourages the government to pursue a preferential 
trade agreement with the country in which its exporters face discrimination. The new 
regionalism, in this reading, can be seen as a process driven by countries responding to 
trade diversion. The main contribution of this paper is the design and execution of a 
quantitative test of this argument that captures the trade diversion logic as directly as 
possible. The empirical results are very supportive; the formation of preferential trade 
agreements is indeed an interdependent process and seems to be largely driven by 
countries responding to the negative externalities of existing agreements. This finding of 
preferential trade agreements as largely defensive instruments is in line with the 
conclusion of a related study, namely that such agreements may ‘benefit members as 
much by locking in the status quo as by improving it.’74
In future research, the present analysis could be extended by considering that 
preferential trade agreements, especially those that include investment provisions, 
threaten both trade and foreign direct investment flows. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement, for example, not only created problems for Japanese companies exporting to 
Mexico, but also for Japanese companies interested in investing in that country.75 Two 
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extensions of the empirical analysis presented here would capture this effect. On the one 
hand, by looking at investment flows, it should be possible to calculate the potential for 
investment diversion resulting from a preferential trade agreement. On the other hand, 
since investment diversion is most likely in cases in which an agreement includes an 
investment chapter, being able to specify exactly which agreements do so would help 
tackle this point. A future study thus may provide an even more comprehensive 
examination of the argument presented here.
The paper has broad implications for the study of International Relations and 
International Political Economy. It presents a causal mechanism that explains how the 
policies of one country can influence the balance of domestic interests in another 
country. An analogous effect could be hypothesized to be at work whenever the policies 
of a group of countries have negative externalities for an excluded country. More 
specifically, cooperation between two or more countries that discriminates against third 
countries should have a pull effect that is comparable to that captured in this paper for 
the case of preferential trade agreements. The European Higher Education Area, which 
aims at making European higher education more attractive, provides an illustration of 
this point. In this case, a cooperation effort that started with four countries in 1998 has 
grown to encompass no fewer than 47 member countries in 2010. One reason for the 
pull effect may be that the cooperation made some university systems more attractive to 
international students than others. Also outside of the trade realm, the spread of 
international agreements thus may be driven by a similar logic to the one detailed here.
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Figure 1: The proliferation of preferential trade agreements, 1990-2007
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Figure 2: The spatial weight for the dyad Chile-U.S. (schematic representation)
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Figure 3: The substantive effect
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Table 1: The diffusion of preferential trade agreements
Covariates
Model 1 Model 2
(3 years)
Model 3
(7 years)
Model 4
(only 
competition)
Model 5
(no log)
TRADE & COMPETITION 2.22**
(0.77)
2.16
(1.12)
1.39*
(0.62)
0.31**
(0.03)
1.04**
(0.39)
SPATIAL DISTANCE -17.28**
(2.38)
-17.22**
(2.39)
-17.29**
(2.39)
-25.96**
(2.11)
-17.48**
(2.36)
SPATIAL LANGUAGE 0.21**
(0.03)
0.21**
(0.03)
0.21**
(0.03)
0.22**
(0.03)
0.03**
(0.00)
SPATIAL COLONY -0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
SPATIAL RELIGION 0.02
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY 0.08
(0.07)
0.08
(0.07)
0.08
(0.07)
0.06
(0.07)
0.08
(0.07)
TRADE 0.04**
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
GDP 0.20**
(0.02)
0.20**
(0.02)
0.20**
(0.02)
0.21**
(0.02)
0.20**
(0.02)
GDP PER CAPITA 0.05
(0.05)
0.05
(0.05)
0.05
(0.05)
0.05
(0.05)
0.07
(0.05)
ALLIANCE 0.53**
(0.07)
0.53**
(0.07)
0.53**
(0.07)
0.53**
(0.07)
0.55**
(0.06)
DEMOCRACY 0.09**
(0.01)
0.09**
(0.01)
0.09**
(0.01)
0.08**
(0.01)
0.08**
(0.02)
DISTANCE -1.21**
(0.07)
-1.21**
(0.07)
-1.21**
(0.07)
-1.24**
(0.07)
-1.22**
(0.07)
CONTIGUITY -0.74**
(0.16)
-0.74**
(0.16)
-0.75**
(0.16)
-0.72**
(0.16)
-0.76**
(0.16)
ISLAND -0.42**
(0.10)
-0.43**
(0.10)
-0.42**
(0.10)
-0.42**
(0.1)
-0.44**
(0.10)
WTO 0.30**
(0.07)
0.30**
(0.07)
0.30**
(0.07)
0.28**
(0.07)
0.32**
(0.07)
MULTI- ROUND 1.15**
(0.11)
1.15**
(0.11)
1.15**
(0.11)
1.24**
(0.11)
1.17**
(0.11)
TRADE DISPUTE -3.09**
(1.03)
-3.07**
(1.03)
-3.07**
(1.02)
-3.05**
(1.02)
-3.09**
(1.03)
TRADE DISPUTE THIRD 
PARTY
-0.18**
(0.06)
-0.18**
(0.06)
-0.18**
(0.06)
-0.22**
(0.06)
-0.16**
(0.06)
LANGUAGE -0.44**
(0.15)
-0.44**
(0.15)
-0.44**
(0.15)
-0.45**
(0.14)
-0.52**
(0.16)
COLONY 0.39**
(0.12)
0.39**
(0.12)
0.39**
(0.12)
0.39**
(0.12)
0.37*
(0.15)
RELIGION 0.16*
(0.08)
0.16*
(0.08)
0.16*
(0.08)
0.17*
(0.08)
0.38**
(0.09)
TEMPORAL LAG -0.03
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.14**
(0.04)
-0.04
(0.03)
Observations 220,861 220,861 220,861 220,861 220,861
Number of dyads 13,617 13,617 13,617 13,617 13,617
PTAs signed 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878
Log likelihood -15,794.90 -15,795.63 -15,795.33 -15,747.87 -15,791.39
Notes: The table reports coefficients from a Cox proportional hazards model. Robust standard errors, 
adjusted for clustering on dyads, are in parentheses. ** Statistically significant at 1%, * statistically 
significant at 5%.
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Data Appendix (Model 1)
Variables Mean Std. 
deviation
Minimum Maximum Data 
sources
Competition TRADE & COMPETITION (LOGGED) 0.0004 0.008 0 1.42 (1) (2) (3)
Competing 
arguments
SPATIAL DISTANCE (LOGGED) 0.0005 0.01 0 2.19 (4)
SPATIAL LANGUAGE (LOGGED) 1.11 1.29 0 3.61 (1) (4)
SPATIAL  COLONY (LOGGED) 1.82 1.33 0 3.97 (1) (4)
SPATIAL RELIGION (LOGGED) 1.78 1.24 0 4.04 (1) (5)
GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY 0.16 0.41 0 4 (1) (6)
Controls TRADE (LOGGED) 1.90 2.33 0 12.46 (2)
GDP (LOGGED) 1.76 1.23 0.10 8.57 (2)
GDP PER CAPITA (LOGGED) 0.70 0.64 0.03 4.16 (2)
ALLIANCE 0.13 0.34 0 1 (6)
DEMOCRACY -5.01 1.84 -7 -1 (7)
DISTANCE (LOGGED) 8.80 0.66 2.44 9.89 (4)
CONTIGUITY 0.01 0.10 0 1 (4)
ISLAND 0.13 0.34 0 1 (4)
WTO 0.51 0.50 0 1 (8)
MULTI-ROUND 0.65 0.48 0 1 (8)
TRADE DISPUTE 0.01 0.07 0 1 (9)
TRADE DISPUTE THIRD PARTY 0.28 0.45 0 1 (9)
LANGUAGE 0.08 0.28 0 1 (4)
RELIGION 0.15 0.36 0 1 (5)
COLONY 0.15 0.36 0 1 (4)
TEMPORALLY LAGGED VARIABLE  (LOGGED) 2.50 1.31 0 4.75 (1)
Sources: (1) see Note 33; (2) IMF, The World Economic Outlook (IMF Data and Statistics, 2008). 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/index.aspx>; (3) World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (World Bank Data&Statistics, 2009). <http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/>; (4) CEPII, Dataset (2006). 
<http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/bdd.htm>; (5) Encyclopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the 
Year (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2001); (6) Correlates of War dataset; (7) Freedom House, Freedom in the 
World (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2007); (8) World Trade Organization, Members and Observers (2008). 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>; (9) Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO 
Dispute Settlement Database (2006). <http://go.worldbank.org/X5EZPHXJY0>.
